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Abstract—We focus on the privacy-utility trade-off encoun-
tered by users who wish to disclose some information to an
analyst, that is correlated with their private data, in the hope
of receiving some utility. We rely on a general privacy statistical
inference framework, under which data is transformed before it is
disclosed, according to a probabilistic privacy mapping. We show
that when the log-loss is introduced in this framework in both the
privacy metric and the distortion metric, the privacy leakage and
the utility constraint can be reduced to the mutual information
between private data and disclosed data, and between non-private
data and disclosed data respectively. We justify the relevance and
generality of the privacy metric under the log-loss by proving
that the inference threat under any bounded cost function can be
upperbounded by an explicit function of the mutual information
between private data and disclosed data. We then show that
the privacy-utility tradeoff under the log-loss can be cast as
the non-convex Privacy Funnel optimization, and we leverage
its connection to the Information Bottleneck, to provide a greedy
algorithm that is locally optimal. We evaluate its performance
on the US census dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a setting in which users have two kinds of
data, that are correlated: some data that each user would like
to remain private and some non-private data that he is willing
to disclose to an analyst and from which he will derive some
utility. The analyst is a legitimate receiver of the disclosed
data, which he will use to provide utility to the user, but can
also adversarially exploit it to infer the user’s private data. This
creates a tension between privacy and utility requirements. To
reduce the inference threat on private data while maintaining
utility, each user’s non-private data is transformed before it is
disclosed, according to a probabilistic privacy mapping. The
design of the privacy mapping should balance the tradeoff
between the utility of the disclosed data, and the privacy of the
private data: it should keep the disclosed transformed data as
much informative as possible about the non-private data, while
leaking as little information as possible about the private data.
The framework for privacy against inference attacks in [1]
proposes to design the privacy mapping as the solution to
an optimization minimizing the inference threat subject to a
utility constraint. Our approach relies on this framework, and
makes the following two contributions. First, we show that
when the log-loss is introduced in this framework in both the
privacy metric and the distortion metric, the privacy leakage
reduces to the mutual information between private data and
disclosed data, while the utility requirement is modeled by
the mutual information between non-private data and disclosed
data. We justify the relevance and generality of the privacy
metric under the log-loss by proving that the inference threat,
defined in [1] as the inference cost gain, under any bounded
cost function can be upperbounded by an explicit function
of the mutual information between private data and disclosed
data. We then show that the privacy-utility tradeoff under the
log-loss can be cast as the Privacy Funnel optimization, and
study its connection to the Information Bottleneck [2]. Second,
for general distributions, the privacy funnel optimization being
a non-convex problem, we provide a greedy algorithm for
the Privacy Funnel that is locally optimal by leveraging
connections to the Information Bottleneck method [3], [2],
and evaluate its performance on real-world data.
Related Work: Several works, such as [4], [5], [6], [7], [8],
have studied the issue of keeping some information private
while disclosing some correlated information, by distorting the
information disclosed. Differential privacy [6], [7] was intro-
duced to answer queries on statistical databases in a privacy-
preserving manner, by minimizing the chances of identification
of the database records. One line of work in information theo-
retic privacy [4], [8] studies the trade-off between privacy and
utility, where they consider expected distortion as a measure
of utility and equivocation as a measure of privacy. [8] focus
mainly on collective privacy for all or subsets of the entries of
a database, and provide fundamental and asymptotic results on
the rate-distortion-equivocation region as the number of data
samples grows arbitrarily large. These approaches are different
from our approach in three ways as we do not consider a com-
munication problem where the rate needs to be bounded, and
we use the average amount of bits as a measure of both utility
and privacy (log-loss distortion or mutual information). The
wire-tap channel, introduced in [9], focuses on designing the
encoder and decoder to release information and protect private
information from an eavesdropper, when utility is measured in
terms of error probability of the decoded message, and secrecy
is measured in terms of normalized mutual information. Our
setting differs from the wire-tap channel, as it does not involve
a third-party eavesdropper, but the analyst is both a legitimate
receiver of the disclosed data, and a potential adversary as it
can use it to try to infer private data. Moreover, we focus on
the privacy mapping design (channel design), with different
measures of privacy and utility.
The log-loss distortion has been studied in [10] as a measure
of distortion in the context of multi-terminal source coding.
Log-loss as measure of distortion is also studied in [11]
where they show that log-loss satisfies certain properties that
leads to the Information Bottleneck method [2]. Finally, for
an overview of the central role of the log-loss distortion in
prediction, we refer the reader to [12].
Outline: In Section II, we introduce the privacy-utility trade-
off against Inference attacks. In Section III, we describe the
privacy funnel method and show properties of log-loss metric,
and then characterize the privacy-disclosure trade-off as the
privacy funnel optimization. In Section IV, we provide a
greedy algorithm to design the privacy mapping and evaluate
it on real-world data.
Notations: Throughout the paper, X denotes a random vari-
able over alphabet X with distribution PX . All random vari-
ables are assumed to be discrete, unless mentioned otherwise.
II. PRIVACY-UTILITY AGAINST INFERENCE ATTACKS
In this background section, we first describe the setting, and
the privacy and utility metrics introduced in the framework for
privacy against inference attacks in [1]. Then, we recall how
the privacy-utility trade-off can be cast into an optimization.
A. Setting
We consider a setting where a user has some private data,
represented by the random variable S ∈ S, which is correlated
with some non-private data X ∈ X , that the user wishes to
share with an analyst. The correlation between S and X is
captured by the joint distribution PS,X . Due to this correlation,
releasing X to the analyst would enable him to draw some
inference on the private data S. To reduce the inference threat
on S that would arise from the observation of X , rather than
releasing X , the user releases a distorted version of X denoted
by Y ∈ Y . The distorted data Y is generated by passing X
through a conditional distribution PY |X , called the privacy
mapping. Throughout the paper, we assume S → X → Y
form a Markov chain. Therefore, once the distribution PY |X
is fixed, the joint distribution PS,X,Y = PY |XPS,X is defined.
The analyst is a legitimate recipient of data Y , which it
can use to provide utility to the user, e.g. some personalized
service. However, the analyst can also act as an adversary
by using Y to illegitimately infer private data S. The privacy
mapping aims at balancing the tradeoff between utility and
privacy: the privacy mapping should be designed to decrease
the inference threat on private S by reducing the dependency
between Y and S, while at the same time preserving the utility
of Y , by maintaining the dependency between Y and X .
B. Privacy Metric
We consider the inference threat model introduced in [1],
in which the analyst performs an adversarial inference attack
on the private data S. More precisely, the analyst selects a
distribution q, from the set PS of all probability distributions
over S, that minimizes an expected inference cost function
C(S, q). In other words, the analyst chooses in an adversarial
way a belief distribution q over the private variables S prior
to observing Y , and a revised belief distribution as
q∗0 = argmin
q∈PS
EPS [C(S, q)],
prior to observing Y , and a revised belief distribution
q∗y = argmin
q∈PS
EPS|Y [C(S, q)|Y = y],
after observing Y = y. This models a very broad class of
adversaries that perform statistical inference. Using the chosen
belief distribution q, the analyst can produce an estimate of the
input S, e.g. using a Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) estimator.
Let c∗0 and c∗y respectively denote the minimum average cost of
inferring S without observing Y , and after observing Y = y:
c∗0 = min
q∈PS
EPS [C(S, q)], c
∗
y = min
q∈PS
EPS|Y [C(S, q)|Y = y].
Thanks to the observation of Y , the analyst obtains an
average gain in inference cost of ∆C = c∗0 − EPY [c∗Y ]. The
average inference cost gain ∆C was proposed as a general
privacy metric in [1], as it measures the improvement in the
quality of the inference of private data S due to the observation
of Y . The design of the privacy mapping PY |X should aim at
reducing ∆C, or in other words it should aim at bringing the
inference cost given the observation of Y closer to the initial
inference cost c∗0 without observing Y .
C. Accuracy Metric
The privacy mapping should maintain the utility of the
distorted data Y . In the framework proposed in [1], the
utility requirement is modeled by a constraint on the average
distortion EPX,Y [d(X,Y )] ≤ D, for some distortion measure
d : X ×Y → R+, and some distortion level D ≥ 0. Assuming
that the distortion measure d is a function of X and Y ,
but not of their statistical properties, the average distortion
EPX,Y [d(X,Y )] is linear in PY |X . Consequently, the distortion
constraint is a linear constraint in PY |X .
D. Privacy-Accuracy tradeoff
The optimal privacy mapping for a given distortion level D
is obtained as the solution of the following optimization
min
PY |X : EPX,Y [d(X,Y )]≤D
∆C (1)
If ∆C is convex in PY |X , then optimization (1) is a convex
optimization, since the distortion constraint EPX,Y [d(X,Y )] is
linear in PY |X .
III. THE PRIVACY FUNNEL METHOD
In this section, we focus on the privacy-utility framework
when the log-loss is used in both the privacy metric and in
the distortion metric. We justify the relevance of the log-loss
in such a framework, and characterize the resulting privacy-
disclosure tradeoff as the Privacy Funnel optimization. Finally,
we show how the Privacy Funnel is related to the Information
Bottleneck [2], and how algorithms developed for the latter
can inform the design of algorithms for the former.
A. Privacy metric under log-loss
In this section, we focus on the threat model under the log-
loss cost function. We first recall that, under this cost-function,
the privacy leakage can be measured by the mutual information
I(S;Y ) between the private variable S and the variable Y . We
then justify the relevance and the generality of the use of the
log-loss in the threat model, by showing that the inference cost
gain for any bounded cost function can be upperbounded by
a function of the mutual information between S and Y .
Under the log-loss cost function C(s, q) = − log q(s),
∀s ∈ S, the privacy leakage can be measured by the mutual
information I(S;Y ), as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 ([1]). The average inference cost gain under the
log-loss cost function C(s, q) = − log q(s), is the mutual
information between S and Y : ∆C = I(S;Y ).
Proof: Let the cost function to be the log-loss defined by
C(s, q) = − log q(s) for any s ∈ S. Then,
c∗0 = min
q∈PS
EPS [− log q(S)] = EPS [− log p(S)] +D(p||q).
(2)
Since D(p||q) ≥ 0, with equality if p = q, we have
c∗0 = H(S). Similarly, we have c∗y = H(S|Y = y). Therefore,
∆C = H(S)− EPY [H(S|Y = y)] = I(S;Y ).
We now justify the relevance and the generality of the use of
the log-loss in the threat model. More precisely, in Theorem 1
below, we prove that for any bounded cost function C(S, q),
the associated inference cost gain ∆C can be upperbounded
by an explicit constant factor of
√
I(S;Y ). Thus, controlling
the cost gain under the log-loss, so that it does not exceed
a target privacy level, is sufficient to ensure that the privacy
threat under a different bounded cost function would also be
controlled. Therefore, the design of the privacy mapping can
be focused on minimizing the privacy leakage as measured by
I(S;Y ).
Theorem 1. Let L = sups∈S,q∈PS |C(s, q)| < ∞. We have
∆C = c∗0 − EPY [c∗Y ] ≤ 2
√
2L
√
I(S;Y ).
The proof of Theorem 1 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let C(s, q) be a bounded cost function such that
L = sups∈S,q∈PS |C(s, q)| <∞. For any given y ∈ Y ,
EPS|Y [C(S, q
∗
0)− C(S, q∗y)|Y = y] ≤ 2
√
2L
√
D(PS|Y=y||PS).
Proof: we have
EPS|Y [C(S, q
∗
0)− C(S, q∗y)|Y = y]
=
∑
s
p(s|y)[C(s, q∗0)− C(s, q∗y)]
=
∑
s
(p(s|y)− p(s) + p(s))[C(s, c∗0)− C(s, q∗y)]
=
∑
s
(p(s|y)− p(s))[C(s, q∗0)− C(s, q∗y)]
+
∑
s
p(s)[C(s, q∗0)− C(s, q∗y)]
≤ 2L
∑
s
|p(s|y)− p(s)|+ (EPS [C(S, q∗0)]− EPS [C(S, q∗y)]),
≤ 2L
∑
s
|p(s|y)− p(s)|,
= 4L||PS|Y=y − PS ||TV
≤ 4L
√
1
2
D(PS|Y =y||PS),
where we used that C(s, q∗0) − C(s, q∗y) ≤ 2L and
EPS [C(S, q
∗
0)] − EPS [C(S, q∗y)] ≤ 0. And the last inequality
follows from using Pinsker’s inequality (where the log in the
definition of divergence is natural log).
We now prove Theorem 1.
proof of Theorem 1: We have
∆C = EPS [C(S, q
∗
0)]− EPY
[
EPS|Y [C(S, q
∗
y)|Y = y]
]
= EPY
[
EPS|Y [C(S, q
∗
0)− C(S, q∗y)|Y = y]
]
≤ 2
√
2LEPY
[
D(PS|Y=y||PS)
] ≤ 2√2L√I(S;Y ),
where the last step follows from concavity of square root
function and the one before that follows from Lemma 2.
B. Accuracy metric under log-loss
Consider the log-loss distortion defined as d(x, y) =
− logP (X = x|Y = y), which is a function of x and y
as well as PY |X . Using log-loss, the average distortion is
E[d(X,Y )] = EPX,Y [− logPX|Y ] = H(X |Y ) that can be
minimized by designing the mapping PY |X . Thus, the con-
straint E[d(X,Y )] ≤ D would be H(X |Y ) ≤ D for a
given distortion level, D. Given PX , and therefore H(X), and
assuming that R = H(X)−D, the distortion constraint can be
rewritten as I(X ;Y ) ≥ R, that is the same as the constraint
of (3). It should be noted that the average distortion under the
log-loss is not linear in PY |X .
For a given PSX and PY |X , where S → X → Y , we define
the disclosure to be the mutual information between X and Y .
C. Privacy-Disclosure Trade-off
There is a trade-off between the information that user shares
about X and the information that user keeps private about S.
We pass X through a randomized mapping PY |X and reveal
Y to the analyst. The purpose of this mapping is to make Y
informative about X and to make Y uninformative about S.
Given PSX , we design the privacy-mappingPY |X to maximize
the amount of information I(X ;Y ) that user disclose about
the public information, X , while minimizing the collateral
information about the private variable S measured by I(S;Y ).
The trade-off between disclosure and privacy in the design
of the privacy mapping is represented by the following opti-
mization, that we refer to as the Privacy Funnel:
min
PY |X : I(X;Y )≥R
I(S;Y ). (3)
For a given disclosure level R, among all feasible privacy
mappings PY |X satisfying I(X ;Y ) ≥ R, the privacy funnel
selects the one that minimizes I(S;Y ). Note that I(X ;Y ) is
convex in PY |X and since PY |S is linear in PY |X and I(S;Y )
is convex in PY |S , the objective function I(S;Y ) is convex in
PY |X . However, because of the constraint I(X ;Y ) ≥ R, the
Privacy Funnel (3) is not a convex optimization [14, Chap. 4].
D. Connection to the Information Bottleneck Method
The information bottleneck method, introduced in [2], con-
siders the setting where a variable X is to be compressed,
while maintaining the information it bears about another
correlated variable S. The information bottleneck method is a
technique generalizing rate-distortion, as it seeks to optimize
the tradeoff between the compression length of X and the ac-
curacy of the information preserved about S in the compressed
output Y . The information bottleneck optimization [2] is
min
PY |X : I(S;Y )≥C
I(X ;Y ) (4)
for some constant C. In the information bottleneck, the com-
pression mapping PY |X is designed to make X and Y as far
as possible from each other (minimizes I(X ;Y )) while guar-
anteeing that S and Y are close to each other. In other words,
in the information botteleneck the mapping PY |S is designed
to make I(S;Y ) large and I(X ;Y ) small. The information
bottleneck optimization (4) bears some resemblance to the
privacy funnel (3), but is actually the opposite optimization.
Indeed, in the privacy funnel, the privacy mapping is designed
to make I(S;Y ) small and I(X ;Y ) large.
Several techniques were developed to solve the information
bottleneck problem such as alternating iteration [2] and ag-
glomerative information bottleneck [3]. A question we exam-
ined is whether algorithms developed to solve the information
bottleneck optimization could be adapted to solve the privacy
funnel optimization. The alternating iteration algorithm [2]
finds a stationary point of the Lagrangian of information bot-
tleneck optimization (4) defined as L = I(X ;Y )− βI(S;Y )
for some β. The stationary point can be a local minimum,
which addresses the information bottleneck, or a local maxi-
mum in which case it addresses the privacy funnel. However,
there is no guarantee on the convergence of this alternating
algorithm to either a local minimum or a local maximum.
Thus, we developed a new greedy algorithm that is guaranteed
to converge to a solution of the privacy funnel, which is the
object of Section IV.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR THE PRIVACY FUNNEL
We showed that the privacy funnel (3) optimization is not
a convex optimization. In this section, we provide a greedy
Algorithm 1 Greedy algorithm-privacy funnel
Input: R, PS,X
Initialization: Y = X , PY |X(y|x) = 1{y = x}.
while there exists i′, j′ such that I(X ;Y i′−j′) ≥ R do
among those i′, j′, let
{yi, yj} = argmaxyi′ ,yj′∈Y I(S;Y )− I(S;Y i
′−j′)
merge: {yi, yj} → yij
update: Y = {Y \ {yi, yj}} ∪ {yij} and PY |X
Output: PY |X
algorithm to solve this optimization and we evaluate it on
real-world data.
A. Greedy Algorithm
Suppose the constraint I(X ;Y ) ≥ R is given for some
R ≤ H(X). We wish to find PY |X that minimizes I(S;Y ).
Note that for Y = X and PY |X(y|x) = 1{x = y} (where
1{x = y} = 1 if and only if x = y), the condition
I(X ;Y ) ≥ R is satisfied because I(X ;Y ) = H(X) ≥ R.
However, I(S;Y ) might be too large. The idea is to merge
two elements of Y to make I(S;Y ) smaller, while satisfying
I(X ;Y ) ≥ R. This method is motivated by agglomerative
information method introduced in [3]. We merge yi and yj and
denote the merged element by yij . We then update PY |X as
p(yij |x) = p(yi|x) + p(yj |x), for all x ∈ X . After merging,
we also have p(yij) = p(yi) + p(yj). Consider the row
stochastic matrix P as Px,y = PY |X(y|x) for all x ∈ X and
all y ∈ Y . In Algorithm (1) we start with P as an identity
matrix and then at each iteration we delete two columns of
P (corresponding to yi and yj) and add their summation as a
new column (corresponding to yij ) to P . Thus, the resulting
matrix at the end contains only zeros and ones, determining
all x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y such that PY |X(y|x) = 1. Let
Y i−j be the resulting Y from merging yi and yj . Algorithm
(1) is a greedy algorithm that uses this idea in order to solve
optimization (3). One need to calculate I(S;Y )− I(S;Y i−j)
and I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Y i−j) at each iteration of Algorithm (1).
Proposition 1 shows an efficient way to calculate them.
Proposition 1. For a given joint distribution PS,X,Y =
PS,XPY |X , we have I(S;Y )− I(S;Y i−j) =
p(yij)H
(
p(yi)PS|Y =yj + p(yj)PS|Y=yj
p(yij)
)
− (p(yi)H(PS|Y =yi) + p(yj)H(PS|Y=yj )) .
We also have I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Y i−j) =
p(yij)H
(
p(yi)PX|Y =yj + p(yj)PX|Y=yj
p(yij)
)
− (p(yi)H(PX|Y =yi) + p(yj)H(PX|Y=yj )) .
Proof: After merging yi and yj , we obtain
p(s|yij) = p(yi)
p(yij)
p(s|yi) + p(yj)
p(yij)
p(s|yj), for all s ∈ S,
p(x|yij) = p(yi)
p(yij)
p(x|yi) + p(yj)
p(yij)
p(x|yj), for all x ∈ X .
Algorithm 2 Greedy algorithm-information bottleneck
Input: ∆, PS,X
Initialization: Y = X , PY |X(y|x) = 1{y = x}
while there exists i′, j′ such that I(S;Y i′−j′) ≥ ∆ do
among those i′, j′, let
{yi, yj} = argmaxyi′ ,yj′∈Y I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Y i
′−j′)
merge: {yi, yj} → yij
update: Y = {Y \ {yi, yj}} ∪ {yij} and PY |X
Output: PY |X
The proof follows from writing I(S;Y ) − I(S;Y i−j) =
H(S|Y i−j) − H(S|Y ) and I(X ;Y ) − I(X ;Y i−j) =
H(X |Y i−j)−H(X |Y ).
Proposition 1 shows that the difference in the mutual infor-
mation after merging changes only if the new variable, yij , is
involved. The greedy algorithm is locally optimal at every step
since we minimize I(S;Y ). However, there is no guarantee
that such a greedy algorithm induces a global optimal privacy
mapping.
Note 1. The minimum of I(S;Y ) in (3) is a decreasing
function of I(X ;Y ) and is achieved for a mapping PY |X that
satisfies I(X ;Y ) = R (if possible due to discrete alphabets).
For a given mutual information, R, there are many conditional
probability distributions, PY |X , achieving I(X ;Y ) = R.
Among which there is one that gives the minimum I(S;Y )
and one that gives the maximum I(S;Y ). We can modify
the greedy algorithm so that it converges to a local maximum
of I(S;Y ) for a given I(X ;Y ) = R. The algorithm which
we call greedy algorithm-information bottleneck is given in
Algorithm (2). Algorithm (1) and Algorithm (2) allow us to
approximately characterize the range of values I(S;Y ) can
take for a given value of I(X ;Y ) as being those between
the local minimum and the local maximum. Interestingly, by
observing the gap between the local maximum and the local
minimum, we have a relative idea on the effectiveness of the
Greedy algorithm, i.e., if the difference is significant it means
a negligent mapping may lie anywhere between those values,
possibly leading to a much higher privacy threat.
B. Data Set
The US 1994 Census dataset [15] is a well-known dataset
in the machine learning community, which is a sample of the
US population from 1994. For each of the entries, it contains
features such age, work-class, education, gender, and native
country, as well as an income category. The income level is a
binary variable which determines whether the income is above
or below USD 50000, gender is a binary variable, education
level is a variable with four categories, age is a variable divided
into seven categories. For our purposes, we consider the private
attributes S = (age, income level) and the attributes to be
released as X = (age, gender, education level). The goal
of the privacy mapping is to release a modified version of
attributes Y which is informative about X but that renders the
inference of S based on Y hard.
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Fig. 1. Maximum and minimum of I(S;Y ) for a given I(X; Y ).
C. Numerical Results
In Fig. 1, we plot the minimum and maximum of I(S;Y )
for a given I(X ;Y ). This figure is based on US 1994 census
data set described before. The top curve shows the maximum
of I(S;Y ) versus I(X ;Y ), using Algorithm (2). The bottom
curve shows the minimum of I(S;Y ) versus I(X ;Y ), using
Algorithm (1). The area between the two curves shows the
possible pairs of (I(X ;Y ), I(S;Y )) as PY |X varies (a subset
of possible pairs, since the algorithms are sub-optimal). In-
deed, we will design the mapping to lie on the bottom curve.
For a given R, if we design the mapping negligently, we may
have I(S;Y ) on the top curve instead of the bottom curve.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We study the privacy-utility trade-off against inference
attacks when the log-loss is used both in the privacy and
utility metrics. We justify the generality of the privacy threat
under the log-loss by proving that the threat under any
bounded cost inference function can be upperbounded by an
explicit function of the mutual information between private
and disclosed data. We cast the tradeoff under the log-loss
as the Privacy Funnel optimization, which is non-convex. We
leverage its connection to the Information Bottleneck to design
a locally-optimal greedy algorithm, that we evaluate on the US
census dataset.
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